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Appellant, Rhoda Lee Lewis, respectfully requests that the 
Court grant a rehearing on its decision in this case filed on 
May 13, 1987 on the sole basis that the Court erred in ruling 
that the will did not create an imperative power of appointment. 
ARGUMENT 
The Supreme Court's decision rejects Mrs. Lewis' argument 
that her husband created a special imperative power of 
appointment in his 1971 will with Ben Lewis, the personal 
representative of the estate, as the donee, and Mrs. Lewis as 
the sole beneficiary of the power. The basis of the Court's 
decision is that the words chosen by the decedent are precatory 
and not imperative. Court's Decision, at 6. 
"Precatory words" are words of "request, desire, wish or 
recommendation . . . as distinguished from direct and 
imperative terms." Black's Law Dictionary, "Precatory Words", 
West Publishing (4th Ed. 1972). Mrs. Lewis's husband did not 
say "please consider" but rather "Insure for her . . . fair 
portion. There are more than ample funds, chattels and 
tangibles to provide this." "Insure," in the context of this 
sentence, means "to make certain especially by taking necessary 
measures and precautions" (Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 
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(G. & C. Merriam Company 1977)) and "to make sure, to 
guarantee, as, to insure safety to any one." Black's Law 
Dictionary, "Insure", West Publishing (4th Ed. 1972). The word 
"insure" is imperative, not precatory. 
Moreover, while the Court recognized that George Lewis' 
will "should be read and understood as a whole, and meaning 
given to all of its provisions considered in their relationship 
to each other," (Court's Decision, p. 6), the Court reached its 
decision that the "words do not express an intention to bestow 
upon another the power to dispose of identified property" 
without considering the relationship between the "insure" 
clause and the last sentence of paragraph one. Court's 
Decision, at 5. George Lewis intended for his personal 
representative "to insure [Mrs. Lewis's] . . . fair portion" of 
the estate by distributing at least some of the "more than 
ample funds, chattels and tangibles to provide this." 
Consider: if the personal representative had decided to 
fulfill this direction in the will (whether precatory or not), 
the only way he could do so would be by distributing assets to 
Mrs. Lewis. As personal representative, he did not have the 
authority or power to do anything else. 
In addition, the Court failed to consider the similar 
language used by George Lewis in his 1969 Will. 
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-First — Through investment, trust/ affiliated funds 
and/or other I charge that a sufficient income be assured 
for my wife Rhoda — one that will provide security without 
the worry of management problems of liquidation, transfer 
disposal, etc. Full comfort and security. 
(R.206). This language is very similar to the language Mr. 
Lewis chose in his 1971 Will. The use of the words MI charge," 
Massure- and wincome- require distributions; those words are 
not -precatory words.- The district court ruled that the 1969 
Will could be used as evidence of George Lewis' intent in 
executing his 1971 Will. The 1969 Will establishes that George 
Lewis was mandating in his 1971 Will that distributions be made 
from his estate for Mrs. Lewis's benefit. 
Thus, the distinction that the Court draws in its decision 
between the language in this case and those of other cases 
where imperative powers have been found is a distinction 
without any logical substance. George Lewis created an 
imperative special power of appointment by his will, and the 
Court should so hold. 
The Court's decision appears to be based on the fact that 
Mrs. Lewis will still receive a portion of her husband's estate 
as one of his intestate heirs. Footnote 13 of the Court's 
opinion distinguishes the Rowland decision (In Re Rowlands' 
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Estate, 73 Ariz. 337, 241 P.2d 781 (1952)) on the basis that 
the Rowland estate would escheat absent a finding of an 
imperative power of appointment. The implication of this 
footnote and other statements by the Court is that the Court 
can reject an otherwise reasonable interpretation of a 
decedent's will if the proponent of the will is entitled to 
other benefits from the estate. This is contrary to prior Utah 
law as well as the law of every other jurisdiction. "Based on 
the presumption against intestacy, the courts will adopt any 
reasonable construction to avoid a conclusion of intestacy." 
Matter of Estate of Gardner, 615 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Utah 1980); 
emphasis added. See also, 80 Am.Jur.2d Wills § 1133 (1975); 
Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 325, 328 (1965). 
Mrs. Lewis appreciates the reasons that motivated the Court 
to conclude that she should only receive a portion and not all 
of her husband's estate. But in reaching that result, the 
Court has trampled over well and long established rules and has 
obliterated any recognizable distinction between precatory and 
imperative words. The Court should recognize that the contrary 
result, that Mrs. Lewis receive the entire estate, is not 
offensive to either the law or public policy. Since 1977, a 
widow in Mrs. Lewis's circumstances would be the sole heir of 
the estate. And while it is easy to say her husband only 
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intended Mrs. Lewis to receive a "fair portion" of the estate, 
it is also true that he did not intend anyone else to share in 
his estate whatsoever. Indeed, what is more offensive: That 
the decedent's wife of 30 years receive the entire estate when 
the decedent specified "insure . . . her fair portion?" Or 
that the decedent's collateral relatives should receive some of 
the estate when they are not named in the will at all? The 
Court has rejected a reasonable interpretation of George Lewis' 
will with numerous precedents in order to preclude Mrs. Lewis 
from receiving her late husband's entire estate. Under the 
facts of this case, the Court's decision establishes an ill 
advised and unfortunate precedent. 
Mrs. Lewis respectfully requests a rehearing on the sole 
issue of whether her husband's will created an imperative power 
of appointment. 
Dated May ^uL9 1987. 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
/CA^OU, / ^ y ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Charles M. Bennett 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Rhoda Lee Lewis 
CERTIFICATION 
As counsel for the Rhoda Lee Lewis, I certify that this 
petition for rehearing is presented in good faith and not for 
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the purpose of delay. 
CDN5737B 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN »EBEKER 
^^u^ /^t/^JZZf 
Charles M. Bennett 
7 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
